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Does the Greek crisis prove the limitations of European integration? Cristina Ares Castro-Conde
writes that the real question facing Europe is not whether integration should be rolled back, but how
European democracy can be improved. She suggests that a ﬁrst step could be to create a parallel
European Parliament composed of MEPs from Eurozone states which has the power to subject the
decisions of the Eurogroup and the European Central Bank to proper democratic scrutiny.
Alexis Tsipras, ﬁrst as the Party of the European Left nominee for President of the European
Commission and later as the Syriza candidate for Prime Minister of Greece, has succeeded in
eliminating the fear of politicising European Union decision-making and, from a favourable stance on the European
project, elaborating and defending a discourse that is contrary to austerity policies. This accomplishment put him
ahead of his social democrat counterparts.
But Tsipras has committed an (almost) unforgivable mistake in Europe: shattering the conﬁdence which sustains
what, from Luuk van Middelaar’s essential book The Passage to Europe, we call the ‘intermediate sphere’ or the
‘circle’ of the Member States. The Greek Prime Minister acted without knowing that European Union countries not
only assume individual roles but also a collective one, and, indeed for a state suﬀering from hard conditionality
provisions, conﬂict between national and European interests can only be handled through reciprocal loyalty.
In another recent work, European Integration. From Nation-States to Member States , Christopher Bickerton defends
the notion that policy-making on a European scale is the national governments’ instrument of defence against the
increasingly complex demands and public expectations of societies, to which they were not able to respond in a
context of growing interdependence. For Bickerton, the Member State that succeeds the Nation State is part of a
new political system characterised by the opposition between society and state, built on the demise during the 70s
and 80s of the Keynesian post-war consensus.
His most controversial argument is that encouraging the process of European integration in the 80s and 90s was the
underlying cause of the current distance between citizens and institutions. This is due to the fact that on many
occasions the European loyalty of national governments is stronger than the pressure received from their societies,
even when citizens articulate their discontent. In Bickerton’s analysis there is no room for recognising the virtues of
the joint role of Member States from the point of view of national interests, nor is there room for hope.
This reading of the integration process is a perverse version of the classic thesis by Alan Milward, who had
previously interpreted the European project as the rescue of nation states: the ﬁnal resource found to satisfy new
social demands. And even Giandomenico Majone in Regulating Europe predicted that the challenges of the
European Union (that could not circumvent the redistributive elements of its policies) would increase political conﬂict
and (with the lack of a strong enough European identity) would reduce its legitimacy.
But Bickerton goes further, stating that the European integration process necessarily limits the margin of political
decisions, and that this reduction is the only viable solution in a globalised world. Following this line of argument, the
crisis of representative democracy in Europe is not one that can be solved. Moreover, the principle of left-right
competition loses its meaning and is replaced with a new political division that pits the defenders of the European
Union (who would applaud the contribution of the European institutions in reducing the size of the public sector
across the continent) against those who oppose technocratic actors surrendering to the markets.
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However Bickerton overlooks the fact that the Union’s institutional design facilitates the adoption of policy decisions
which beneﬁt the majority of European citizens, in
contrast with the greater dependence of national
governments on their clientele and interest groups.
Innumerable examples could be found to illustrate the
positive societal eﬀects of moving a wide-array of
decisions to the European level; but, Bickerton does
not see them. At no moment does he ask why the
process of European integration, and especially
monetary integration, is not welcomed by the so-
called markets. Nor does he consider that in a
globalised world the only possibility for maintaining
the European social model may be to accelerate
political union and establish a new social contract at
the supranational level.
Since 23 April, 2010, when Greece sent its ﬁrst
application for ﬁnancial aid, funds have been
mobilised to support countries with diﬃculties through
successive mechanisms of stability from the Greek
Loan Facility (GLF) to the current European Stability Mechanism (ESM) – a more permanent solution with more
potential. Closer co-ordination of economic governance has been pursued through the “six-pack”, the Treaty on
Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) and the “two-pack”. Meanwhile banking union has been facilitated
through the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), Single Resolution Mechanism and Fund (SRM and SRF) and
Directives on deposit guarantee schemes. In a nutshell, as might be expected, the process of integration in the
Eurozone was accelerated and the gap separating the countries of the euro from the rest of the Member States
continues to grow.
This greater integration could be read through the lenses of Professor Bickerton, placing the focus on the
conditionality of aids and how the new framework of economic governance was ﬁxed. But, if Tsipras had read
Bickerton with a healthy dose of scepticism, perhaps he would have already ﬂipped his argument and considered
the most relevant question: how can democracy in the EU actually be improved?
In early July the Greek Prime Minister came to present his petition for ﬁnancial assistance to the European
Parliament, and we had the opportunity to listen to the speakers establishing the position of the political groups.
Tsipras said that his country had been the laboratory of austerity over the last ﬁve years, and that this had failed.
The European People’s Party accused him of dividing Europe; the Socialist Party asked him for responsibility and a
constructive attitude to save Greece and Europe; the Liberals challenged him to demonstrate that he is truly a
revolutionary leader who can drive the necessary reforms in Greece rather than just an “electoral accident” and a
“false prophet” who will end up impoverishing the Greek people; and the British Conservatives reminded him that he
had damaged Europe’s trust. The Left Party, the Green Party and even Marine Le Pen sided with Tsipras against
austerity policies.
The European Parliament was noticeably empowered by the Treaty of Lisbon in many policy domains. Does its role
in the management of the last Greek crisis in particular and in economic and monetary aﬀairs more generally not
seem strange to us? A ﬁrst step to improving democracy would be the constitution of a mini Parliament composed of
the European parliamentarians of the countries of the Eurozone, that (while waiting for a new reform of the Treaties
that could enhance the role of the Assembly in co-deciding and controlling economic and monetary issues) at least
publicly debates the topics of the Eurogroup agenda and the political decisions of the European Central Bank.
Returning to The Passage to Europe, fortunately Europe has succeeded in leaving the “hell” of the Nation-States; it
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does not make sense to turn back to nowhere nor to burn the only bridge (the intermediate sphere of the Member
States) that leads to the “paradise” of a united Europe, even if the ﬁnal destination is far from view and the weather
is bad. However this is not the moment to provide warnings, but rather to demonstrate generosity, just as there is
much left to do, especially for European social democracy, to prove that there are promising alternatives to current
economic policies – and that Bickerton was mistaken.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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